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Putting Rivers Back
in the Landscape:
The Revival of Watershed
Management in the
United States
By A. Dan Tarlock

Introduction: Rivers and Watersheds as
Commodities

At the dawn of the progressive conservation era, river basin planning and watershed
management were to be the centerpieces of
water resources planning.1 For most of this
century, however, natural resources policies
and laws have promoted watershed degradation. Today, the resource values2 of watershed
ecosystems are being rediscovered. The current revival of interest in watershed management in the United States is driven by a variety of not entirely consistent factors.
Watershed management is seen as an alternative to costly command and control water
pollution regulation or, more broadly, as the
logical progression from the early focus on
individual discharges to a more “ecorealistic
context”3 which seeks to prevent pollution
rather than to treat waste discharges and
drinking water. The watershed is the preferred
problem-solving method of the federal
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) as
it tries to stop nonpoint sources of pollution
from canceling out the gains from point controls.4 More generally, watershed management reflects the recognition that we can only
sustain biodiversity by managing entire
ecosystems. For example, the preservation of
the Florida Everglades requires that the
 A. Dan Tarlock, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College
of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stanford University. This paper was
initially prepared for an International Conference on Integrated
Water and Land Management held at the Faculty of Law at the
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland,
Australia, July 11-12, 1996. The conference was organized by
Professor Douglas Fisher and I would like to thank him for
expanding my knowledge of comparative watershed management law.
1. See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920
(1959). This book is the standard in the United States history of
river basin development ideology.

OF

2. Economists now value natural resources by their total
economic value, which includes traditional use, as well as passive non-use values such as ecological services. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING GROUNDWATER: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND
APPROACHES 48-55 (1997).
3. See Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation,
15 J.L. & COM. 549, 553 (1996).
4. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Water Quality
Standards, INSIDE EPA’S WATER POLICY REPORT, June 29, 1998.
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entire watershed be managed to prevent their
continuing degradation.5
The rediscovery of watershed values is
nationwide, but it has special relevance in the
Western United States. Many Western river
basins are stressed from a variety of land and
water use practices, especially nonpoint
sources of pollution. Salmon are on the brink
of extinction in the rivers along the Pacific
coast. Their perilous condition has been
brought about by a combination of damming,
timber harvesting practices, agricultural run-off
and diversions, as well as non-anthropocentric
climate cycles. The Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta is stressed from upstream diversions that
increase the risk of saltwater intrusion in dry
years. Many smaller watersheds face a variety
of stresses. For example, Salt Lake City is concerned that the 2002 Winter Olympics will put
new stresses on its watershed which has provided high quality water since Brigham Young
declared City Creek a protected drinking water
source in 1851. A major winter storm could
shut down the city’s Mountain Dell reservoir
due to salt run-off from I-80, and an increase in
backcountry camping could increase the risk of
contamination to the drinking water supply.6
Watershed management is politically attractive because it has the potential to promote
consensus rather than conflict.7 Many watersheds have experienced bitter and prolonged
conflicts over the application of national standards to longstanding land and water use practices. The watershed can be a focus for local
interests to resolve conflicts, consistent with
federal standards, because diverse stakeholders possess a common interest in a specific
resource that will allow them to transcend their
differences. Many permanent and special river

basin management agencies and ad hoc watershed coalitions have sprung up in recent years
and are potential partners for EPA and other
federal agencies to craft specific solutions to
“place-based” controversies. However, the
institutions that have supported watershed
degradation are difficult to reform, as well as
slow to adapt to the effort to use the watershed
as a “problem-shed” because they presume
that nature must be improved for human benefit.

5. See generally Thomas H. Ankersen & Richard Hamann,
Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A Legal and Institutional
Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473 (1996). For a further discussion of the Everglades protection efforts, see discussion infra
Section V.B.

INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE GROUPS IN NATURAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT (University of Colorado Natural Resources Law
Center 2000).

6. See Watersheds/Utah–2002 Winter Olympics, WESTERN STATES
WATER (Weekly Newsletter of the W. States Water Council,
Midvale, Utah), Dec. 31, 1998, at 1-2.
7. This assertion is more a hope than a reflection of experience. For a penetrating theoretical but skeptical review of consensus processes, see DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, ARGUING ABOUT
CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED
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A. We Love Nature But We Love to Improve
Her More
The basic cause of watershed degradation
is human manipulation of river systems and
the conversion of adjacent watershed land to
urban, industrial and agricultural use.
Degradation is a global environmental problem, and throughout the world, countries are
trying to integrate land and water use planning
and regulation in watersheds or catchment
basins. This integration is extremely difficult
because it cuts against the grain of history and
the legal expectations that developed from this
history. The story of modern civilization is
largely one of accelerating watershed development. Until the last one hundred years, river
behavior was a constraint on river and corridor
development; thus, land and water management were integrated by inherent physical limitations.8 Technology enabled us to remove the
previous limitations on river and watershed
development and produced the current nonintegrated watershed management characterized
by: (1) the transformation of rivers from natural
to artificial systems, and (2) unsustainable
watershed development and land use practices.

8. For a good application of this thesis to the ancient
Mediterranean world, see J. DONALD HUGHES, PAN’S TRAVAIL:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS AND ROMANS 35-40
(1994). Hughes argues that religious beliefs combined with the
limits of available science and technology were used to promote
sustainable resource patterns. However, neither the Egyptians
nor the Greeks and Romans were good watershed managers.
Deforestation, overgrazing and erosion permanently changed the
Mediterranean landscape to the bleak, if romantic, one that we
know today. See id. at 73-90.
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9.

See generally HAYS, supra note 1.

10. One of the most extensive and sad examples of
impoundment occurred in the Upper Missouri river basin. Five
main stem flood control reservoirs built in the 1940-50s took 550
square miles of the Native American tribal lands with “nominal”
tribal benefits. See JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF
PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 80-83 (1994).
11. For example, dams and diversions on the Columbia
River and timber harvesting practices on the tributaries have virtually destroyed valuable salmon runs. See, e.g., WILLIAM DETRICH,
NORTHWEST PASSAGE: THE GREAT COLUMBIA RIVER (1995). Additionally,
fish-timber harvesting conflicts are now pervasive on many
watersheds. See, e.g., Swanson v. United States Forest Service, 87
F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (providing review of forest management
plan’s effect on listed salmon species).
12. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, OUR NATURAL HISTORY: THE LESSONS
LEWIS AND CLARK 21-38 (1995). There is vast technical literature
on the irrationality of the use of dams as the primary flood reduction strategy. See, e.g., ELMER THEODORE, BIG DAM FOOLISHNESS: THE
PROBLEM OF MODERN FLOOD CONTROL AND WATER STORAGE (1954);
LUNA B. LEOPOLD, THE FLOOD CONTROL CONTROVERSY: BIG DAMS, LITTLE
DAMS, AND LAND MANAGEMENT (1954); GILBERT WHITE, FLOOD HAZARD
IN THE UNITED STATES: A RESEARCH ASSESSMENT (1975); HENRY
BERESFORD-PEIRSE, FORESTS, FOOD, AND PEOPLE (1968); PETER BLACK,
CONSERVATION OF WATER AND RELATED LAND SOURCES (1982); RAYMOND
J. BURBY, FLOOD PLAIN LAND USE MANAGEMENT: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT (1985); ROBERT N. STAVINS, FORESTED WETLAND DEPLETION
OF

and downstream saline and toxic pollution, as
well as waterlogged land.13 Intensive timber
harvesting practices pollute rivers and contribute to the decline of historic fish runs.14
These adverse impacts have been well documented by geographers15 and others. Most
societies, however, have been unable to prevent and mitigate these impacts and, in fact,
often make them worse by continuing to subsidize inappropriate watershed activities.16
B. The Watershed Restoration Agenda:
Difficulties in Moving From Theory to
Practice
Ambitious experiments are underway to
restore many degraded river systems and to
protect healthy watersheds from future degradation. This effort requires myriad site-specific
and regulatory efforts ranging from education
and the voluntary adoption of new land management practices to the reduction of withdrawals and the construction of new water conservation facilities. These varied efforts have
three common themes. First, many traditional
land and water management practices must be
modified to restore the region’s ecological
health and protect the region from future
degradation.17 Second, these efforts require
IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
POLICY AND PROGRAMS (1988).

OF

FEDERAL

13. See, e.g., PHILIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER NO MORE: THE
COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST (1981); PETER BEAUMONT,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN DRYLANDS (1989).
14. For example, the National Marine Fisheries Service
listed the northern California coast Coho salmon as a threatened
species under the Endangered Species Act, and identified the
adverse impacts of timber harvesting practices on coastal stream
systems as one of the factors contributing to the decline of the
species. See Endangered and Threatened Species, 61 Fed. Reg.
56,138 (1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 227).
15. See ANDREW GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IMPACT
ENVIRONMENT 177-234 (4th ed. 1993).

ON THE

NATURAL

16. Since 1968, the federal government has provided subsidized flood insurance conditioned on the adoption of local
flood plain land use regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4028
(1994). A recent assessment notes that “[p]articipation in NFP
river floodplains and flood-prone areas is high, . . . yet many
experts believe that the results have been minimal.” Robert W.
Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973,
1034-35 (1995).
17. See generally RECLAIMING THE NATIVE HOME OF HOPE:
COMMUNITY, ECOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN WEST (Robert B. Keiter ed.,
1998) (providing a collection of essays which redefine the western
landscape to balance human use and ecosystem functions).
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Scientists in the United States have long
been aware of the costs of unplanned and
unregulated watershed development, and they
have advocated integrated watershed planning
and management as the cornerstone of river
basin development. However, for most of the
twentieth century the ideal of integrated watershed management was subordinated to intensive, structural multiple-purpose river basin
water project development in the name of scientific conservation.9 We have conserved water,
but not the landscapes and ecosystems that
produced it. The result was massive watershed
degradation because the land uses that result
from the conversion of riparian land, especially flood plains, to more intensive uses were
largely unregulated and unplanned. The consequences of this neglect of watersheds include
difficult to control sources of water pollution,
productive land inundated by large impoundments,10 and destroyed or changed forest
ecosystems.11 For example, flood control dams
and levees opened up flood plains to development, although, paradoxically, structural flood
control measures increase the cost of floods
when they occur by inducing extensive development in the flood plain.12 Large-scale arid
region irrigation schemes produce salty soils

The Revival of Watershed Management in the United States
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both new management practices and the application of technology. Third, although these
efforts must be tailored to specific watersheds,
they often must be integrated into emerging
large river basin restoration and management
regimes. In short, effective prevention, mitigation and remediation of negative environmental impacts requires no less than a reversal of
our country’s deeply entrenched urbanization,
agricultural and silviculture production patterns. It also requires awareness that technological manipulation of natural systems, especially rivers and forests, is always beneficial.18
The idea that the benefits of improving
nature always exceed the costs is difficult to
reverse because it is so deeply embedded in
the law and philosophy of watershed use. We
have been conditioned to appreciate the value
of altered and managed riverine landscapes.19
Historically, the flow of large river systems and
their adjacent corridors have been perceived
as under-used natural resources that should
be extensively developed or used for waste
disposal. Thus, rivers have often been conceptually and functionally “detached” from their
surrounding landscape. River corridors ceased
to be considered resources that should be
subject to special protection regimes.20 In the
United States, large river systems have been
viewed as commodities21 and this has contributed to the “detachment” of rivers from
their surrounding ecosystems. Both science

and law have contributed to the “detachment”
of rivers from their watersheds. Hydrology is
the science of river manipulation22 and geographers concerned with possible adverse effects
of the relationship between river unmodified
and river behavior were relegated to a marginal status. Law turned both land and water into
commodities to facilitate intensive development.
This article examines the new focus on the
resource values of “ecologically healthy”
watersheds from two perspectives. First, it
takes a historical perspective to demonstrate
why it is difficult to achieve effective integrated land and water management. The “negative” thesis of this article is that the major
obstacle to integrated watershed management
is the persistence of entitlements to use land
and water without regard to the adverse environmental watershed impacts. This article
explains the theoretical underpinning of the
laws that govern the use of river systems and
their watersheds in the United States. Doing
so provides the context to understand the
problems that ongoing efforts to implement
an ecosystem approach to river management
face.
The second perspective examines the
efforts to promote ecologically healthy watersheds. Watershed governance is a paradox
because the idea is being promoted by those
who want to substitute top-down command

18. Criticism of this assumption has been a persistent
theme in environmental thinking. See generally THEODORE
STERNBERG, SLIDE MOUNTAIN OR THE FOLLY OF OWNING NATURE (1995).

tom. A watershed biodiversity strategy would ensure protection
of more species than would a land-based strategy. As John
Haubert, a river specialist in the Department of Interior,
observed, “one well-placed river with 50,000 acres might be more
important than 500,000 acres of wilderness or national park on a
glacier.” TIM PALMER, THE WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS OF AMERICA 34
(1993) (quoting John Haubert).

19. See I.G. SIMMONS, ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST 29-41 (1993) (providing a brief survey of
the principal forces behind the counter-environmental transformation).
20. The reintegration of water and land is supported by
the current recharacterization of biodiversity conservation as the
primary purpose of environmental regulation. This is a helpful
paradigm shift, but biodiversity preservation remains primarily a
land rather than water-based science. Biodiversity protection has
centered almost exclusively on the creation of large, terrestrial
biodiversity reserves rather than on the protection and restoration of river corridors, and thus ironically has reinforced the
detachment of rivers from their surrounding landscapes.
Biodiversity strategies must be rethought to focus on watersheds
with rivers in the center (rather than as an edge) to enhance the
protection of whole systems. Unlike the usual two-dimensional
biodiversity protection strategy, this reconfigured watershed
geometry is three-dimensional. Watersheds are not only long and
narrow, but deep, and are measured from ridge top to river bot-
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21. The influence of western European law and economic
theory on the perception of land and related resources as commodities, from the time of settlement, has been explored brilliantly by the environmental historian William Cronon. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983); WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S
METROPOLIS (1991). The adverse consequences of the “commodification” of nature is, of course, the central theme of modern environmentalism. See Lester W. Milbrath, The World is Relearning Its
Story About How It Works, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA: MOVEMENTS, PARTIES, ORGANIZATIONS AND POLICY
21, 41 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed., 1993).
22. See COMMITTEE ON OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC
SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES 38-43 (1991).

WEST

II. The Role of Water Law In Detaching
Rivers From Their Corridors
A. Competing River Visions
Water law has contributed to watershed
degradation by making it easy to disrupt hydrologic and ecosystem functions by dewatering
watersheds. We are now beginning to calculate
the high social and environmental costs of
maximum development, and this calculation is
creating a counter-ethic to the historic one of
maximum commodity development. In the
United States, the costs are primarily environmental and, to a much lesser extent, social.23
However, in the developing world the costs are
equally environmental and social—foreign
dam projects often have devastating impacts
on local subsistence economies.24 As a result of
domestic and international environmental and
human rights movements, supported by fifty
years of economic criticism of the efficiency of
public investment in water resources projects,
the idea that regional multiple-purpose river
projects will provide both fair and efficient eco23. One example of social disruption occurred in Hawaii.
Native Hawaiians now criticize the commodification of watersheds during the period that the islands were a United States territory and the consequent destruction of the indigenous communal taro culture. See Elizabeth Ann Ho’oipo et al., Cultures in
Conflict in Hawai’i: The Law and Politics of Native Hawaiian Water Rights,
18 U. HAW. L. REV. 71, 83-97 (1996).

nomic development has been challenged. Dam
projects in developing countries have been
opposed because they displace minority populations, inequitably distribute water, and often
fail to deliver the promised economic benefits.25
Two river function visions, maximum development of the water resource and maintenance of the ecological integrity of large river
systems, now compete for policy dominance.26
Ecological integrity still remains subordinate
to the older vision of maximum exploitation,
however there have been a number of recent
national and grassroots efforts to implement
ecological sustainable watershed management
practices. United States and international
water allocation rules support maximum
development that reinforces the detachment of
land and water. Water law reflects the assumption that the manipulation of nature should be
encouraged and thus does not incorporate the
full social costs of altered flow patterns and
watershed functions. Water law treats rivers as
commodities separate and apart from land,
which is itself a commodity. Water law has
effectively created “quasi-exclusive” property
rights to put the right to exploit and consume
water on the same footing as the right to develop land. Water law directly supported the
destruction of the ecological integrity of rivers
and their flood plains by allowing unlimited
human alteration of watersheds. This same
story for land is told in the next section.
Throughout the world, the theory that water
and river basins are simply under-developed
commodities is being replaced with a focus on
the maintenance of the ecological integrity of
the watershed as the major planning and management objective. The goal of maximum physical development through multiple-use projects, which dominated water and land use
thinking until the late 1960s, has been challenged and supplemented by the sustainable
24. See generally W.M. ADAMS, WASTING
PEOPLE AND PLANNING IN AFRICA (1992).

THE

RAIN: RIVERS,

25. See generally BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH (1994);
E. GOLDSMITH & N. HILDYARD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS
OF LARGE DAMS (1984).
26. See A. Dan Tarlock, River Management in the Twenty-First
Century: The Vision Thing, 6 RIVERS: STUDIES IN THE SCIENCE,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND LAW OF INSTREAM FLOW 43 (1997).
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and control regulations for voluntary and collaborative problem solving to achieve national
environmental objectives. However, neither
the federal environmental programs nor the
Constitution are well adapted to support these
efforts, and substantial legal questions exist
about the use of local programs either to
define or to implement a federal standard. On
a more positive note, the article concludes that
a new vision of urban and rural landscapes and
the relationship between human settlement
and natural systems is required to address the
adverse impacts of river and watershed development. At the present time, the future of the
West’s unique landscape is uncertain, however
there are signs that a new balance between
respect for the natural values and functions of
land and water and human use is emerging.

The Revival of Watershed Management in the United States
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ecosystem paradigm. This paradigm posits
that river systems are dynamic, ever-changing
ecosystems which serve a variety of purposes
from the maintenance of consumptive uses to
the maintenance of the river’s historic natural
functions for both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric reasons.27 The newer ecological integrity vision is less clearly articulated
than the older vision because it rests on a complex and dynamic view of nature and
humankind’s role in the functioning of natural
systems.28 It is not a simple river preservation
concept, but rather one that advocates integrating human use of a river system with the
maintenance of its natural environmental sustainability.29 Integrated watershed planning
and management will not be effective unless
we find ways to incorporate the costs of watershed degradation into private entitlements.
This newer river basin vision seeks to provide a
framework for integration of watershed planning and management by identifying a river’s
hydrograph and the natural functions sustained by the flow over time and by recognizing
that property rights must be defined in relation
to the watershed community as well as to the
individual right holder. These functions include
the maintenance both of natural systems, such
as wetlands, and human economies. The flow
cycle of the pre-Aswan Dam Nile is the classic
example of the ecological-social vision,30 as the

post-dam river is a prime example of the commodity vision. This new river basin vision has
its roots in bioregionalism,31 the long and ineffective history of watershed planning in the
United States, and an interest in the implementation of environmental policy on both
large and small scales.32
The emerging sustainable ecosystem paradigm is still too crude and imprecise to provide
concrete guidance about the precise balance
between development and environmental protection in a specific watershed. For example,
the paradigm can support a range of approaches. These vary from the creation of narrow river
corridor vegetation preservation bands to
buffer the river from permitted development,
to a more radical ecological ideal that the
maintenance or restoration of the “natural”
functions of river systems and their flood
plains should control development patterns.33
However, the sustainable ecosystem paradigm
is a radical break with the past view that rivers
and watersheds should be developed intensely. This paradigm also provides the basis for
using rational hydrologic and land use background levels as the foundation for watershed
management.34

27. See generally Anthony Scott & Georgia Coustalin, The
Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821 (1995). This article surveys the growing tension between the commodity and
community-conservation visions and suggests that new trusts
will emerge to hold water rights for instream as well as out of
stream uses and that river corporations will be created to manage
water for the full range of uses.

1 to 3-3 (1998).

28. The leading exposition in the United States of this thesis is DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES (1991). For an exploration of the potential influence of the non-equilibrium paradigm
on environmental law, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Non-Equilibrium
Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994), and Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan
Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An
Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994). For lawyers looking for
a good introduction to modern ecology and its influence on environmental management, see Judy L. Meyer, Changing Concepts of
System Management, in SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 78 (Water
Science and Technology Board ed. 1993), and Judy L. Meyer, The
Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875
(1994).
29. See REPORT OF THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY
COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-
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30. Nile irrigation began to be modified in the nineteenth
century and barrages and dams were constructed to regulate the
River’s flow, but historic patterns were relatively maintained until
the construction of the High Aswan Dam. See generally H.E. HURST,
THE NILE (1952).
31. Australia is a leader in this movement. See, e.g., J.M.
POWELL, THE EMERGENCE OF BIOREGIONALISM IN THE MURRAY-DARLING
BASIN (1993).
32. For a comprehensive survey of the factors that contribute to the current interest in watershed-based protection
strategies, see Adler, supra note 16, at 1057-79.
33. Professor Ludwik A. Teclaff has been one leading advocates of the need to recognize the benefits of historic flood cycles
as well as the benefits of flood control. See generally Ludwik A.
Teclaff, Treaty Practice Related to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 109 (1991); LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN
HISTORY AND LAW (1967).
34. See The Independent Scientific Group, Return to the
River: An Ecological Vision for the Recovery of Columbia River Salmon, 28
ENVTL. L. 503 (1998) (explaining the sustainable ecosystem paradigm as applied to the Columbia River).

WEST

B. Water Rights, Multiple Use and
Integrated Watershed Management
Water law has historically contributed to
nonintegrated watershed management by
removing natural river behavior as a constraint
on watershed development. The law has facilitated the regulation of rivers and transwatershed diversions. There are, however, some
hopeful counter-trends. In recent years, the law
has contributed to the maintenance of instream
flows. Instream flow protection is an important
component of integrated watershed management. A few American states are beginning to
integrate water and land use to try to ensure
that development does not outstrip available
water supplies,35 but the legacy of water management as physical conservation remains
strong.
The movement to conserve water resources
originated in scientific surveys of the American
West36 and the need to find a formula to sustain
the settlement of the nation’s arid and semiarid areas.37 Scientific conservation theory was
driven by theories of production efficiency and
assumed that the entire river system should be
intensively developed and managed to maximize its economic potential through largescale, multiple-use projects. Multiple-use
became the organizing principle of both public
and private water development and management. The major uses were irrigation, municipal
and industrial, hydroelectric power generation
and flood control.38 Environmental values were
largely absent from this calculation or, when
present, were secondary. “Conservation” provided the scientific and political bases for the principle of maximum water development that flowered between the turn of the century and the
mid-1960s.

Scientific conservation did not separate
land from water; in fact, early proponents of
conservation recognized the close relationship
between land and water management and the
importance of regulating land use in the
watershed. The conservation movement, however, set in motion the process of separation
by making water development paramount to
watershed management. The United States
has a long history of failed attempts to integrate water and land use because it has always
opted for structural river development rather
than integrated resource management.39 The
debate regarding water resources in the
United States has, in fact, been dominated by
the idea of comprehensive and coordinated
federal river basin development to promote
efficiency and social equity. At the height of
the Conservation Era, President Theodore
Roosevelt appointed the Inland Waterways
Commission, which recommended a federal
waterways commission to coordinate all river
basin development. A fight between the older
Corps of Engineers and new Bureau of
Reclamation, however, led to the rejection of
coordinated river management. Thus, after a
ten-year fight, any hope of federal integrated
watershed planning died in Congress.
Congress did create a regional development authority to promote social equity in the
Tennessee Valley region. The Tennessee Valley
Authority has become a global model of river
basin development, but it has never been
repeated on any other United States river.
River basins are not natural political boundaries and the states and powerful constituencies refuse to cede political power to the federal government or an independent political
body. Intensive federal water resources planning programs were put in place between the
1930 and 1970s, however their objective was

35. See A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth
Management and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos,
5 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 182 (1998/1999).

38. See Stephen McCaffrey, The Evolution of the Law of
International Watercourses, 45 AUST L.J. PUB. INT’L L. 87 (1993).

36. See generally WILLIAM H. GOETZMANN, EXPLORATION
EMPIRE: THE EXPLORER AND THE SCIENTISTS IN THE WINNING OF
AMERICAN WEST (1966).

AND
THE

37. See, e.g., DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE (1985); MARC
REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER (1986).

39. The basic reason for structural development has been
the ease with which the central government—either state or federal—could construct water resources projects combined with
the impossibility of controlling the development of the basin
because the river basin is not a political unit. See Norman
Wengert, The River Basin Concept as Seen From a Management
Perspective, in STRATEGIES FOR RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT 287, 299
(Lunquist, et al., 1985).
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primarily to facilitate the construction of large,
multi-purpose reservoirs to subsidize regional
development.40 Non-consumptive uses and
non-structural flood control measures
remained secondary to engineering solutions
that encouraged maximum use and development.41
During the New Deal, there were efforts to
focus on the land use impacts of federal development,42 however these efforts were unsuccessful, as was another effort in the 1960s.
Between 1965 and 1980, seven river basin commissions with broad planning powers to coordinate federal and state water and related land
use development were formed, but their promise was never realized. As the influential
National Water Commission noted in 1973,
“[w]ater planning sometimes appears to be an
end in itself.”43 Ultimately Congress ignored the
experience by defunding the program. River
planning in general has fallen into disrepute in
part because the environmental movement
took full advantage of the economic criticisms
of subsidized regional water development virtually to shut down large-scale federal dam
construction. Thus, the driving force behind
national river basin planning had exhausted
itself by the mid-1970s.
C. Water Law: The Creation of the Right to
Consume
1. The Common Law of Riparian Rights
The common law of water rights is a land40. See BEATRICE HORT HOLMES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MISC.
PUB. NO. 1233, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS,
1800-1960 (1972); BEATRICE HORT HOLMES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
MISC. PUB. NO. 1379, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES
PROGRAMS 1960-1970 (1979).
41. See INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW
COMMITTEE, SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY 142-143 (1994).
42. See generally NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, REGIONAL
FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING (1935).
43. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES
FUTURE 366 (1973).

FOR THE

44. See Lynda Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a
Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private
Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95, 111-115 (1987).
45. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF
STATE WATER LAWS 32 (Richard Dewsnup & Dallin Jensen eds.,
1973).
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based water allocation system that could serve
as a watershed-based conservation regime,44
but it has generally performed this function
only by default. A riparian right is a usufructory
right to use a portion of the flow of a watercourse that arises by virtue of ownership of land
bordering a stream or lakes.45 The common law
of riparian rights limited use to riparians within
a watershed and prohibited each riparian from
diminishing the natural flow of the stream.46
Under the pressure of industrialization and
urbanization, the common law has been modified to allow water to be used consumptively
and in some cases away from the river corridor
and watershed when there is no substantial
injury to other users.47 For example, the merits
of riparian rights were extensively debated in
California in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Upstream users, especially electric utilities, were afraid that the doctrine would
block access to water and contribute to the
monopolization of the resource by downstream
users.
Today, California and most other states
have solved the problem by permitting the reasonable use of water.48 The reasonable use doctrine replaced the natural flow doctrine and
allows the appropriation of surplus water (water
beyond that used by riparians) for storage and
use outside the watershed.49 All in all, the doctrine has not blocked access to consumptive
uses by major users. Municipalities have exercised the power of eminent domain to condemn
water rights outside of their territorial limits
46.

See Butler, supra note 44, at 111.

47. See, e.g., Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980). However,
the watershed rule continues to surface in new contexts. In 1994,
Florida created a commission to review its water management
law, which has liberal transbasin transfer rules. Water-rich counties convinced the commission to recommend to the legislature
that local sources be favored. Before a trans-basin diversion
could be authorized, a water management district would have to
consider the proximity of the source to the proposed destination
and the availability of alternative sources of water. Two commentators have characterized the recommendation as “a partial
revival of the common law rule that prohibited the diversion of
water to use on nonriparian lands.” Marcia Penman Parker & Sally
Bond Man, Water Management: Mission Impossible?, 70 FLA. BAR J. 20,
28 (1996).
48.

See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.

49. See Clifford Schultz & Gregory Weber, Changing Judicial
Attitudes Toward California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to
Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031, 1041 (1988).
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and to transfer water to areas of demand. In
many states it is becoming easier to sever water
rights from riparian land.50 The common law had
a per se rule against transwatershed diversions.
At both the federal level and in most states,
however, an environmental impact assessment
process has been substituted for per se prohibitions against movement across watershed
boundaries.
Groundwater allocation is another example
of the use of water law to divorce land from
water. In arid areas, groundwater law helps to
deplete streams and the dependent riparian
vegetation because the common law neither
constrains use on overlying land nor prohibits
transfers to centers of demand.51 In addition, the
common law treats groundwater as a separate
source of water from streams, and thus pumpers
may exercise their rights to dewater streams and
their vegetation corridors without regard to the
impact on riparian surface rights.52 Groundwater
was initially allocated by the ownership of overlying surface land, however this has created
greater conservation and environmental problems because no comparable riparian sharing
limitations were imposed upon use.53 In some
states, this rule has been modified to impose
minimal sharing obligations.54

Public utility law has also promoted urban
growth in watersheds. Water suppliers have
assumed that they have a duty to meet any
demand, although public utility law in fact gives
suppliers more discretion to match service with
supply.55 Modern statutes are rapidly eroding
the assumption that there is an absolute duty to
serve. States are beginning to follow Arizona’s
lead in linking water supply planning and urban
growth.56 For example, a 1995 California law
requires that environmental impact statements
(“EIS”) for large projects assess the capacity of
the public water provider to meet the existing
and future demands of the project.57 This imposes important new planning responsibilities on
local governments. A California case holds that
an EIS for a large real estate development is
deficient if it defers consideration of the adequacy of water supplies for the entire project.58
In Stanislaus, a county authorized a resort in the
foothills of the Sierra Nevada mountains that
would be followed by residential units.59 No
long-term water supply was available for the
residential component of the project, and the
court held that the water supply issue could not
be deferred until a subsequent EIS which
assessed the residential phase of the project
could be completed.60

50. See Richard Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water Law,
48 NEB. L. REV. 325, 366-69 (1969). See generally Thomas Ziegler,
Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by Municipalities, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 349 (1959).

Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984).
Prior appropriation often produces the same result because it is
difficult to apply priority principles to groundwater, and thus priorities are seldom enforced. For example, most states have
rejected a senior “right to lift” because it would freeze pressure
levels and discourage subsequent use. See Wayman v. Murray City
Corp. 458 P.2d 861 (1969). Juniors have a right to lower pressure
to a “reasonable” level. States have taken some steps to correct
the anti-conservation incentives of these rules. In some states,
ground and surface rights are integrated, but the purpose of the
law is mainly to protect senior surface users and not the ecological integrity of the watershed. Many arid states have conservation regimes which could be used to promoted integrated management, but historically they have not been so used.

51. See COMMITTEE ON CHARACTERIZATION OF WETLANDS,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND
BOUNDARIES 153-155 (1995).
52. There have been some efforts at integration. See A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4.11 (The Clark
Broadman Environmental Law Series Vol. 1, 1988). However, in
the majority of states, the two legal regimes often operate independently of each other.
53.

See id.

54. Two rules developed to allocate the resource. Under
the absolute ownership rule, an overlying landowner can use as
much water as he can pump unless the purpose is malicious.
Many courts modified the absolute ownership rule by adopting
the reasonable use rule, but this is not an effective limitation on
most uses. A pumper may still use as much as can be pumped,
without regard to surface stream impacts, so long as the use is for
a productive purpose and is confined to the overlying land.
Neither of these rules prevents rapid exploitation or prior use.
Modern law only provides small pumpers who have been dewatered a right of compensation. The Restatement of Torts provides
large-scale pumpers may be liable for if “the withdrawal of
groundwater unreasonably causes harm to a proprietor of neighboring land.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979). See also

55. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
§ 5.13[b] (1988).
56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-211(1) (1996) (stating that the
Department of Water Resources must determine planning horizon for municipal retention of water rights).
57.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 10911(a).

58. See Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of
Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182 (5th Dist. 1996).
59.

See id.

60. See id. at 185. I have addressed these issues in more
detail in, A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah Bates Van de Wetering, Growth
Management and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelegos,
5 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 182 (1999).
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2. The Law of Prior Appropriation
Prior appropriation is the ultimate river
and watershed engine of destruction because
it allows the last possible amount of a stream
to be diverted and depleted to satisfy prior
rights. For example, in the last major Western
drought, small trout streams in Montana were
dewatered to satisfy prior rights.61 Appropriative water rights are theoretically the opposite
of riparian rights: there need be no relationship between the source of water and the locus
of use.62 Los Angeles, for example, enjoys
water appropriated from the Colorado and
Owens Rivers hundreds of miles from the city.
Los Angeles effectively foreclosed growth in
the Owens Valley watershed because of its
diversions and has done substantial environmental damage that is now being redressed.63
Prior appropriation is therefore a use-based
rather than land-based system of property
rights. The system was developed in the mining camps of California to allocate water for
placer mining.64 It spread throughout the West
because it was thought to promote irrigation
economies.
Appropriate rights are not tied to the locus
of the use of the water. They apply to direct
flow diversions and to the storage of water for
subsequent release. Water can be used any
place to which it can be transported within a
state.65 A water right is perfected by diverting
water and applying it to a beneficial use.
Rights are allocated by priority. In times of
shortage, there is no pro rata curtailment.
Junior rights must cut back so that senior right
holders will obtain the full amount of their

rights. Holders of senior rights are entitled to
take the full amount of their rights regardless
of the comparative efficiencies of junior and
senior uses. These rules were generously
applied to cities. The growing communities
doctrine, for example, allowed cities to appropriate water to meet the anticipated future
capacity of its system.66 In addition, most western states have also applied the doctrine of
prior appropriation to groundwater, but the
large pumping states of California, Nebraska
and Texas have not.
Prior appropriation does have some riparian elements that support watershed protection.67 For example, junior appropriators have
vested rights to return flows,68 and therefore
stream systems enjoy de facto, but unsecure,
minimum flow levels. A senior right holder may
generally only transfer the amount of water
actually consumed in order to protect downstream users. Some states have enacted area
of origin protection statutes.69 However, as the
West turns to “water marketing,” large scale
permanent or temporary transfers, to reallocate water from agricultural to urban and environmental uses,70 return flows are diminishing.
Recent droughts in the western United States
have exposed substantial fish population and
riparian vegetation to extreme stresses from
the prior appropriation doctrine. A number of
states have tried to address this problem by
recognizing various forms of instream flow
rights to sustain fish populations in designated rivers. Initially, the law of prior appropriation did not recognize rights unless there was a
diversion, but most western states now have

61. See Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky:
Balancing Agricultural and Recreational Claims to Scarce Water Resources
in Montana and the American West, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 276
(1992).

water right is the actual application to beneficial use rather than
the capacity of a private municipal water system. See State Dep’t
of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998). The Court left
open the issue of whether the holding applies to municipal water
suppliers. See id. The growing communities doctrine was strongly
endorsed in the dissenting opinion. See id. at 1257-58 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).

62. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
63.

See generally Tarlock & Bates, supra note 60.

64.

See People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08 (1980).

67. See A. Dan Tarlock, The West Returns to Riparianism, 27
WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 987 (1991).

65. Ironically, many states have imposed statutes that
prohibit or restrict the export of water across state lines. Export
prohibitions are unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce, but statutes that prefer in to out-of-state users
may be constitutional. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941
(1982).

68. See McDonald v. Bear River and Auburn Water &
Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220 (1859).

66. However, the Washington Supreme Court has limited
the reach of this doctrine. The Court held that the measure of the

70. See NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
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69. See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Charles W.
Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in Transbasin Water Diversions: An
Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 527 (1986).
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3. Native American and Federal Public
Land Rights
Native American tribes have a special class
of water rights that adhere to treaty and executive order reservations and these rights may be
used to promote watershed conservation.75 The
distinguishing feature of all aboriginal peoples
is that their identity is tied to a specific geographic location. Thus, these group rights are
more strongly tied to the watershed of origin
and could be the basis for the integration of
water and land use on Indian reservations.
Indian reservations are the remnants of the
pre-European society that existed in North
America before its discovery and conquest.
These reservations sometimes are the true
aboriginal homelands and, in other cases, they
represent wastelands on which tribes were
resettled in the nineteenth century. All reservations may claim implied federal reserved
Indian water rights to support reservation uses
because they are pre-existing or aboriginal
71. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Terese A.
Rice eds., 1993).
72.

See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60 (1971).

73. See National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
See also Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text
and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1155 (1995).
74.
75.
(1908).

See National Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712 (Cal. 1983).

rights reserved by the treaty creating the reservation or they were granted by the federal government, as owner of all public lands including
Indian reservations.76
The Supreme Court first recognized tribal
water rights in the case of Winters v. United
States.77 The Supreme Court held that the tribe
had superior rights to state appropriators
because tribal rights date from the creation of
the reservation. The Court reasoned that reservations were set aside to transform Indians
into settled irrigators and that the rights were
necessary to fulfill Congress’ “civilizing” mission.78 Tribal water rights have characteristics
of both appropriative and riparian rights and
are superior to most state created-rights.
Winters rights are “quasi-riparian” because the
right is based on land ownership, not, as in the
case with appropriate rights, on the application of water to beneficial use. But, they are
also appropriative because the right has a priority date; the usual priority date is the date of
the creation of the reservation.79 Since most
reservations were created to clear the way for
non-Indian settlement, this date is sufficient to
give the tribe a right superior to most state-created rights. True aboriginal rights based on
immemorial practices would, of course, be
superior to any state-created right.
Until the 1960s, tribal rights were asserted
by the federal government under its trust
responsibility. As a result, Winters rights were
generally only claimed to support existing or
planned tribal irrigation needs, and were thus
minimal since federal irrigation funding lagged
far behind non-Indian subsidies. Winters rights
are now asserted directly by the tribes and tribal-state tensions have risen. Tribes assert
rights to large amounts of water long allocated
by state law, to the use of water for irrigation
76. The proposition, much despised among Native
Americans today, that Indian tribes have no title against the federal government because the Indians only occupied, rather than
possessed, the land was established in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S.
543 (1823).
77.

207 U.S. 564 (1908).

78.

See id. at 576.

79. See Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More
Questions Than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994).

See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
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instream flow protection programs that permit
states to reserve or appropriate water for this
use.71 The public trust doctrine can also promote integrated watershed management by
requiring the preservation of minimum flows
necessary to sustain local fish populations. In
brief, the doctrine posits that states hold navigable waters in trust for an expanding compass
of public uses that include watershed and environmental protection.72 A landmark California
decision held that vested appropriative rights
are subject to the public trust.73 As a result, the
right holder, the City of Los Angeles, had to
cutback on diversions from the tributaries to a
lake on the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada
because lower lake levels threatened the stability of Mono Lake’s fragile ecosystem.74
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and non-irrigation purposes, and to the right to
lease the water for non-reservation uses. In
1963, the Supreme Court held that the right
entitled the tribes to all the water necessary to
irrigate the “practicable irrigable acreage” on
the reservation.80 This standard requires that
the land be (1) capable of irrigation, and (2) at
a reasonable cost.81 Practicable irrigable
acreage gives many tribes large blocks of paper
water rights.
Many tribes want to use water for non-consumptive, non-irrigation uses and these uses
can be the foundation for reservation watershed protection and restoration strategies.
Courts have also recognized Winters rights for
instream flows and fisheries,82 but the idea has
not been universally accepted. The Wyoming
Supreme Court held that Winters does not apply
to either groundwater or to the use of water for
fisheries maintenance.83 Winters rights are also a
source of off-reservation transfers and thus
could frustrate watershed restoration or protection efforts. However, the legal power of tribes
to transfer water remains disputed.84 The power
to lease to non-Indians is often asserted but
has never been directly judicially sanctioned.
The transfer to tribal land and probably water
requires congressional consent under the
Nonintercourse Act of 1790 and this may apply
to leases as well as permanent title transfers.85
80.

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

81. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 165 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d
sub. nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 496 (1989). Arizona
has rejected this narrow reading of Winters. See In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to the Use of Water in the Gila River
System and Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that federal reserved rights apply to groundwater beneath Indian reservations and other federal lands such as national parks, monuments,
wildlife preserves and military bases). Indian tribes and federal
land managers may claim reserved rights in unappropriated
waters beneath the land. The non-subflow pumpers are subject
only to the limitations of the reasonable use rule because the
Court had previously held that the law of prior appropriation
applies only to the waters of surface streams and their subflow.
See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to the Use of Water in
the Gila River System and Source, 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993).
However, the Court rejected the distinction as artificial and held
that under federal law surface and groundwater are integral parts
of the hydrologic cycle. See 989 P.2d at 748.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1983).
83. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 174.
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Indian tribes may also protect their reservations against upstream pollution in the watershed. Section 505 of the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) allows tribes to adopt more stringent
water quality standards than those required by
the federal EPA or the state in which the reservation is located.86 Rio Grande River Pueblo,
located below the city of Albuquerque, adopted
a more stringent sewage discharge standard for
arsenic than required by the state of New
Mexico by classifying its portion of the river for
ceremonial use.87 Federal courts have held that
tribes have the same power as states to adopt
more stringent water quality standards and
thus EPA has the authority under section 510 of
the CWA to approve these standards.88
The federal government may also assert
reserved rights to carry out the water-related
purposes of public land withdrawn for a waterrelated use, but the Supreme Court has effectively refused to allow the doctrine to be used
for watershed protection.89 Federal land management agencies have tried to use these rights
to protect riverine stream corridors in national
forests and grazing lands, but the Supreme
Court has basically rejected the use of federal
rights for this purpose except for national parks
and monuments;90 thus, the doctrine plays a
minimal role in watershed conservation. Most
non-Indian reserved rights claims are based on
84. Western states have long argued that tribal reserved
rights were recognized solely for the purpose of transforming
nomadic into pastoral people and thus they cannot only be used
for on-reservation irrigation. As Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United States confront the special problems of defining
rights to protect unassimilated aboriginal groups and give them
a fighting chance of survival, the nature of aboriginal rights must
be clearly confronted. Canada, for example, limits aboriginal
rights to pre-European practices. See A. Dan Tarlock, Can Cowboys
Become Indians: Protecting Western Communities as Endangered Cultural
Remnants, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 539, 578 (1999).
85.

See Royster, supra note 79, at 82-83.

86.

33 U.S.C. § 1365.

87. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733
(D.N.M. 1993), aff’d, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
88. See id.; see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 275 (1998).
89. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Wilderness Act is an
implied reservation of all unappropriated waters in the wilderness watershed, but it is not certain the opinion will stand in the
face of intense water user opposition. In re SRBA, No. 39576, slip
op. (Idaho, Oct. 1, 1999), reh’g granted.
90.
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4. Regulatory Water Rights
Federal environmental mandates are a
potential, but inconsistent, source of watershed protection because they allow the federal
government to protect both the quantity and
quality of the stream flows. The protection of
biodiversity in river corridors requires the
recognition of rights to some level of minimum
flow. In addition to state laws that create
instream flow rights, the federal government
has the power to mandate conservation flows
through the assertion of federal regulatory
water rights. Regulatory water rights are de
facto rather than de jure proprietary rights
which arise because of federal and state regulatory programs. Regulatory property rights refer
to federal programs which require flow releases
to fulfill the regulatory mandate but which may
be inconsistent with state water law. The three
most important federal programs that can
supersede state water law are sections 401 and
404 of the CWA92 and the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (“ESA”).93 Prior to the 1970s, the federal government generally asserted only proprietary water rights.
Programs such as the Federal Power Act of
1920,94 CWA and ESA, have the potential to
require that large quantities of water be
released from federal reservoirs or left in

streams to fulfill the federal program objectives. These decisions may preempt state water
allocation law and thus often drive current
watershed protection efforts. For example, ESA
applies to both new and existing federal water
projects and to federally licensed projects.95
Section 401 of the CWA96 is another source of
new regulatory rights that gives the states
increased power to protect their watersheds
from the adverse water-quality related effects of
federally licensed projects. The section requires
state certification that a federal facility or
licensed facility complies with state water quality standards.97 A 1994 United States Supreme
Court decision holds that a state may refuse to
certify a hydroelectric facility because the proposed minimum flow schedules were inadequate to meet the state’s anti-degradation standard.98 The Court refused to confine state certification to chemical pollution, calling the distinction between water quantity and quality
“artificial.”99
The effect on vested state water rights
remains unclear but sufficient uncertainty
exists for states and private parties to seek
alternatives, such as voluntary watershed
restoration, to the regulatory programs. In
1982, ESA was reauthorized without carving out
a special exception for western water rights,100
and it has been interpreted to allow the federal
government to deny the necessary federal permits to enjoy state water rights,101 to require
that the federal government dedicate previously dedicated reservoir blocks to the protection
of endangered species,102 and to enjoin state
water rights holders from continuing diversions
that harmed endangered species.103 State regulatory water rights may exist as well as similar
statutes or under assertions of the “public
trust.”104

91.

See id. at 702.

99.

92.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1344.

100.

93.

16 U.S.C. § 1531.

94.

16 U.S.C. § 729.

95.

16 U.S.C. § 1535.

96.

33 U.S.C. § 1341.

97.

16 U.S.C. § 1344.

98. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep’t
of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).

See id. at 706.
See Pub. L. 97-304 (1982).

101. See Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d
508 (10th Cir. 1985).
102. See Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Clark, 741
F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District,
788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
104.

See Weber, supra note 73, at 1168.
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the implied rather than the express intent of
Congress in withdrawing public land from entry.
In a case denying reserved rights for national
forests, the Court developed a high threshold
test: (1) there must be strong evidence of
implied intent, (2) the water must be for the primary not secondary purpose of the reservation,
and (3) the right is limited to the minimum
amount of water necessary to carry out the purpose of the withdrawal.91
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Watershed protection has also been
enhanced by the impact of pollution abatement
programs. Most point source discharges have
been substantially reduced, and we are now just
beginning to see the secondary impacts on land
use that cleaner water is producing. For example, the application of the CWA to New York’s
Hudson River has revived fisheries in it through
the elimination of conventional and toxic pollution. PCB problems remain, although the risks
that this level of PCB exposure presents are
highly uncertain.105 Communities along the river
are reorienting themselves to the river, which
had been dedicated to industrial use and transportation, and are now treating the river as an
ecological system and valuable amenity.106 The
revival of the Hudson has also stimulated a
greater sense of river-centered regionalism
among the riparian communities.107
5. International Law
International law might serve as a model to
integrate land and water use, but the concept
has been strongly resisted by the international
community. First, the law’s historic function has
been to set the ground rules for comprehensive
river basin development and to promote treaties
among riparian states for the allocation of large
rivers.108 In recent years, draft water law rules
have added important environmental protection
mandates, but it is very difficult to promote the
protection of the ecological integrity of river systems because protection is not a conventional
water use. Flood plain and wetland protection
are largely excluded from these new rules which
are focused on pollution prevention.
105. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Study Finds Little Risks From
PCBs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at A12 (reporting that workers
exposed to PCBs did not have significantly higher incidence of
cancer compared to non-exposed groups).
106.

See id.

107.

See id.

108. See A. Dan Tarlock, International Water Law and the
Protection of River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 181
(1996).
109.

See 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997).

110.

Id. at 704.

111. This statement could be contested in light of the nascent international legal regime to conserve biological diversity.
See PHILIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
Ch. 10 (1995).
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International water law is a channel-based,
not watershed- or ecosystem-based, legal
regime, and this focus is inherently biased
toward development and against ecosystem
protection. The United Nations Convention on
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Waters,109 prepared by the International Law Commission of the United
Nations and opened for signature in 1997,
applies to international watercourses and not
river systems. The term “watercourse” is narrowly defined in the Convention as “a system of
surface and undergroundwaters constituting
by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary
whole and flowing into a common terminus.”110
The definition is progressive because it
includes connected groundwater. However,
excluded from the rules are land in the watershed and probably confined aquifers, so the
law does not promote environmental management. Ultimately, this is a step backward from
previous definitions of international river systems. Land use practices, such as clear cutting
timber, effectively remain outside of any international restraints. The exploiting nation’s
legal regime remains the controlling regulatory
authority.111 Domestic and international legal
regimes maintain a persistent but artificial
separation of rivers from the flood plains112 and
wetlands which influence them (and which
they influence) to prevent water use rules—
premised on the need to share a common
resource—from becoming a basis for land use
regulation.113 Further, under some interpretations of equitable apportionment, traditional
practices such as the use of flood waters may
112. Human actions that dampen or eliminate natural disturbances are likely to be a threat to biodiversity in many kinds of
environments. For example, many riparian plant species such as
cottonwoods become established after floods, which create new
deposits of bare silt and gravel where seedlings can establish.
Eliminating periodic flooding by building dams may prevent
regeneration of many species and drastically alter riparian plant
communities. See REED E. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERIDER, SAVING
NATURES LEGACY: PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY 95 (1994).
See generally Thayer Schudder, The Need and Justification for
Maintaining Transboundary Flood Regimes: The Africa Case, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 75 (1991).
113. See Ludwick A. Teclaff, Treaty Practices Relating to
Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 109 (1991) (surveying
the extremely limited international legal recognition of the values of flood cycles).
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III. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: A Case
Study in Non-Integration
The difficulty of integrating river corridor or
watershed protection with water use and management is illustrated by the history of the
implementation of the United States Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act (“WSRA”).118 The WSRA could
be, but is not, a model watershed protection
act.119 In 1968, Congress passed the WSRA to
recognize and preserve free-flowing rivers with
“outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural or
other similar values.”120 The WSRA has effec114. Article 5(e) includes “conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resource and the cost
measures taken to that effect” and Article 5 mandates that international water courses be “used and developed . . . with a view
toward obtaining optimal utilization therefrom consistent with
adequate protection of the watercourse.” 36 I.L.M. 710.
115.

See 36 I.L.M. 710.

116. Id.
117. See Charles M. Carvell, The North Dakota Garrison
Diversion Project and International Environmental Law, 60 N.D. L. REV.
603 (1984).
118.

16 U.S.C. § 1271.

tively stopped many water projects on large
rivers,121 but it has been less effective at controlling incompatible corridor land uses and
upstream watershed degradation. The primary
problem with the WSRA is the lack of integration of corridor and watershed management
with the protection of rivers. From 1965 to
1968, the focus on river protection broadened
from prohibiting dam building to the inclusion
of river management.122 However, the WSRA did
not create a strong corridor management program.
There is some statutory basis for managing
publicly-owned land to promote biodiversity.123
However, few rivers have a single landowner
along the entire river, much less within the
whole watershed, and most rivers have a
patchwork of public and private owners. In the
absence of land use regulation, privatelyowned land along WSRA-designated rivers is at
risk for activities which increase erosion and
pollution, harming the values for which the
river was preserved. Land development along
rivers ranks as the greatest concern to public
interest groups interested in designating a
river under the WSRA or managing alreadydesignated rivers.
The subordination of flow protection to
corridor management is an important element
missing from current biodiversity and watershed protection programs. Riparian or streamside systems are exceptionally rich, “contributing disproportionately to biological diversity.”124 Not surprisingly, the WSRA works best
when the rivers are located on public lands.
The designation to protect watersheds of rivers
flowing through private lands has been controversial because land owners fear condemnation. This fear successfully blocked inclusion of
119. This section is drawn from Carolyn Raffensperger & A.
Dan Tarlock, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act at 25: The Need for a New
Focus, 4 RIVERS 81, 83 (1993).
120.

16 U.S.C. § 1271.

121.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a).

122. Congress established the WSRA in order to complement “the national policy of dam and other construction.” Id.
123. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:
Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293,
297 (1994).
124. Reed Noss, What Can Wilderness Do for Biodiversity?, 1
WILD EARTH 51, 66 (1991).
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be inefficient and impose a duty on a riparian
state to conserve water for the benefit of downstream states. Waste counts against a state in
the balancing test because conservation has
traditionally meant that water should be efficiently consumed.114
Environmental factors play a secondary
role, although the Convention has made commendable efforts to incorporate them into
international water law. The Convention contains several innovative environmental protection rules. For example, Article 20 requires that
states protect the ecosystems of international
watercourses,115 and Article 22 requires a state
to take all measures necessary to prevent the
introduction of alien species into a river system if the species “may have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse.”116 This
standard comes from the objections that
Canada lodged to the United States Garrison
diversion in North Dakota.117 However, the fact
remains that the protection of a river system’s
ecological integrity remains secondary to the
promotion of development.
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the Cacapon and Shenandoah rivers in West
Virginia. In response to vociferous opposition
to the use of the power of eminent domain,
the WSRA encourages easements on privately
owned land rather than outright acquisition.125
Condemnation is prohibited if more than half
of the river corridor is already in public ownership, or where a local zoning ordinance conforms to the purposes of the Act.126 These provisions limit the ability of managing agencies
to procure entire watersheds for protection.
Rivers brought into the system through state
action have a further limitation: management
(except for federally-owned lands) cannot be
at the expense of the federal government.127
However, land can be acquired through the
Land and Water Conservation Act of 1965,
which is exempt from the ban on federal dollars.128
Public land management creates problems even when agencies have the power to
integrate land and water management. Public
land management has never been unified.
Agencies generally have pursued separate
missions with little inter-agency coordination.
Federal agency cooperation is gradually taking shape under pressure from environmental
protection mandates and citizen watershed
groups. Fragmented public land management
can frustrate river corridor and watershed protection on wild and scenic rivers. The system
is an orphan within the federal government
with no strong advocates among the federal
land management agencies. The result is a
disjointed program with little money and little vision. The agencies that are to work
together managing designated rivers, the
Departments of Interior and Agriculture, have
long had a fractious relationship. These interagency tensions have resulted in rivers qualified for inclusion but dedicated as recreation
and not wild rivers, such as the Little Miami in
Ohio.
125.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1285.

126.

See id.

127.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1273.

128.

16 U.S.C. § 4601-4.

129. See, e.g., Deschutes River Landowners Committee, 136
INTERIOR BOARD LAND APPEALS 105 (1996) (stating that the Bureau
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An additional problem in assigning the
management of WSRA-designated rivers to
these agencies is that they traditionally have
multiple-use mandates, whereas the WSRA is
a single-purpose mandate designed to protect
rivers with remarkable characteristics. Having
the Department of Agriculture manage a wild
river flowing through a national forest where
there is extensive logging can result in conflict
between the agency’s mandate to promote
multi-uses in the forest and the protection of
the river from erosion associated with logging.
To the extent that a river could be protected
for outstanding fish or wildlife, riverine biodiversity may be compromised by an agency sacrificing the river to its multi-use land management mandate.129
Fragmentation among the federal land
management agencies is a major impediment
to the integration of land use controls and
water values. No single federal agency has
jurisdiction over the system, and either states
or the federal government can manage component rivers. A single river can be managed
segment by segment by different federal, state
or tribal agencies depending on the management or ownership of the land through which
it flows. This makes consistent management of
an entire watershed difficult at best. The
WSRA itself provides for different managers
depending on which agency had prior jurisdiction over the river.130 Thus, state agencies or
the federal Departments of Interior or
Agriculture can all have jurisdiction over wild
and scenic rivers depending upon the prior
classification of the corridor. State agencies
administer river segments that came into the
system through state action, the Department
of Agriculture administers rivers that are contained in National Forests, and the Department of Interior manages the remaining rivers.
The rejection of the Smith River in
Northern California illustrates this problem.131
of Land Management has discretion to increase public access to
a wild and scenic river).
130.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a).

131. See Sally K. Fairfax et al., Federalism and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417,
424 (1984).
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132.

See id. at 444.

133. Environmentalists have mounted powerful arguments that in the nineteenth century, the protection of watersheds was one of the primary purposes for which national forests
were established. See George C. Coggins, Watershed as a Public
Natural Resource on Federal Lands, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1991); Charles
F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in
the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 202-204 (1985).
134.
135.

attributes of the area and on what designation
a river receives. However, the directive to
enhance the values which caused it to be
included in the system offers a unique opportunity to restore biodiversity in a protected
river. Enhancing and restoring river quality
stands in marked contrast to activities such as
mining and logging which degrade river quality. The WSRA recognizes the special harm that
mining can do to a river by prohibiting the
activity within one-quarter mile of the banks of
a wild river.138 Mining activity can continue on
recreational rivers and is supposedly regulated
by the managing agency.139 While mining is not
the major threat that dams were to the entire
system, it has caused confrontations and environmental problems across the country. Gold
and gravel mining, in particular, have posed
particular harm to rivers due to the instream
processes required for the mining operation.
Timber harvesting and grazing are two of
the most environmentally damaging activities
that take place along river corridors. Clear-cutting on erodible lands can lead to massive siltation and turbidity of the water with a consequent loss of biodiversity. Grazing causes erosion and siltation. Congress directed managing
agencies that “[p]articular attention shall be
given to scheduled timber harvests . . . and similar activities that might be contrary to the purposes of [the WSRA].”140 This limit is particularly important in Oregon, a prime logging state
that also has over 1600 miles of rivers in the
wild and scenic river system.141 It is projected
that river designation will reduce the annual
allowable timber sale on public land by seven
million board feet.142 Additionally, the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)143 is a
potential tool for integration because it can be
used as the basis to invalidate management
136.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1281.

137.

Id.

138.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1280(a).

139.

See id.

140.

16 U.S.C. § 1283(a).

141.

See PALMER, supra note 20, at 252.

See Fairfax et al., supra note 131, at 444.

142.

See id.

See PALMER, supra note 20, at 44.

143.

42 U.S.C. § 4321.

183

NORTHWEST

The Secretary of the Interior rejected designation of 2760 miles of the Smith River as a wild
and scenic river because it would conflict with
logging in the Six Rivers National Forest.132
Under United States public land laws, the
Forest Service, housed in the Department of
Agriculture, not Interior, has a strong timber
production mandate,133 although the Service is
a recent convert to watershed protection.
Moreover, the seventy-six miles that were
included were designated as recreational,
rather than wild, so that logging and mining
could continue.134 The irony is that of all
California rivers proposed for inclusion, only
the Smith was undammed its entire length.
The Smith was later protected as a National
Recreation Area, a Congressional designation
outside of the WSRA emphasizing recreation
and restricting logging.135 The WSRA recognizes
that such conflicts may occur and specifies that
for rivers running through wilderness areas,
national parks or national wildlife refuges, the
more restrictive law governs management of
the rivers.136 It may be presumed that the more
environmental or preservationist law is the
more restrictive. In the face of conflicting laws
or management practices this clause can be
used to enhance biodiversity.
Timber harvesting, mining, logging, grazing
and recreation create acute problems for river
quality and watershed integrity. These activities are permitted along designated rivers, but
they can be managed under a provision of the
WSRA which specifies that “[e]ach component
of the national wild and scenic rivers system
shall be administered in such a manner as to
protect and enhance the values which caused it
to be included in said system.”137 Management
plans may specify varying degrees of protection and development based on the special
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plans that are internally inconsistent with the
protection of a wild and scenic river.144
IV. Land Use Controls and the
Constitutional Protection of Property
Many of the major causes of watershed
degradation stem from unsustainable land
uses within the watershed. With minor exceptions, United States land law has always promoted the settlement and intensive development of land.145 In addition, the law frustrates
integration by allocating land and water by two
different property rights regimes. One, water, is
premised on shared, semi-exclusive property
rights, while the other, land, is premised on
exclusive property rights. Both these regimes
were regulated to minimize some of the obvious social costs of the exercise of private
rights. However, this dual regulation frustrates
integrated watershed management because
the United States, like most countries, has created a fragmented maze of regulatory and planning authorities to deal with land and water
separately. Thus, the fundamental but artificial
dichotomy between land and water makes it
difficult to integrate land and water management through existing land use and environmental regulatory regimes.146 Formal integrated
144. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Green, 953 F. Supp.
1133 (D. Or. 1997) (holding NEPA may apply to on going management activities when the agency’s duties change as the result
of the designation of a wild and scenic river). In 1988, Congress
designated the Donner und Blitzen (Thunder and Lightening)
River in Oregon as a wild river under the WSRA. See 16 U.S.C. §
1274(a)(74). Most of the river flows through public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). BLM prepared the required management plan with the help of the Nature
Conservancy. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n, 953 F. Supp. at 1137.
The Nature Conservancy report recommended that grazing be
stopped along the entire river because parts of the ecosystem
had been degraded by it. See id. However, BLM relied on a subsequent statement of the biologist who authored the report that
livestock grazing should be banned in the canyon areas of the
river, where topography and fences largely exclude it, but that a
“well-crafted” allotment management plan be implemented in
flatter areas. See id. at 1138. BLM adopted a river management
plan after it issued an environmental assessment, which did not
require the exclusion of cattle from any new part of the river. See
id. The plaintiff disagreed with the plan because it failed to protect and restore “a very threatened ecosystem type.” Id. at 1139.
ONDA argued that the plan required the preparation of a full EIS.
See id. at 1146. BLM countered with the argument that an EIS is
not required for the continuation of the status quo. See id. at 1147.
The court held that an EIS was required because the BLM was not
simply continuing a prior management activity. See id. “Once the
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planning, where it is practiced, cannot compensate for fragmented and incomplete regulatory authority. Land use planning and regulatory regimes often exclude the watershed and
riparian impacts of the use of rivers. Until very
recently, water users had no duty to consider
the land use implications of the exercise of
their rights.147
The single largest legal barrier to the protection of river corridors is the possibility that
the necessary intensive regulation will be
found to be an unconstitutional taking of private property without due process of law, as
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. River corridor protection is both an example of sensitive lands
protection and an important component of
biodiversity protection; however, this protection is difficult to accomplish because it
requires intrusive land use controls.148 All land
use regulation, especially the protection of
sensitive lands, disturbs political and legal
expectations of easy and rapid land conversion. Rapid development is the cardinal value
throughout the world, regardless of the system
of government. Conversion is inherent in market systems because all resources, including
land, are commodities to be exploited by
development or transfer. In the United States,
Donner und Blitzen became a component of the WSRA system,
intervening duties were imposed on the agency’s decision-making process with respect to management activities.” Id. See also
GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 10G.04[1]-[2] (1993).
145. See Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform,
Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1139, 1467-72 (1994). Land
development generally has not respected hydrologic limitations.
For a summary of the environmental consequences of the development of urban oases in the western United States, see
BEAUMONT, supra note 13, at 116-125, 402-448.
146. See generally Adler, supra note 16. For an excellent case
study of these problems in New South Wales, Australia, see
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENDER’S OFFICE, INLAND RIVERS: STRATEGIES FOR
ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT (1994).
147.

See infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.

148. Reviewing a moratorium on land development in a
municipal watershed, a court noted that “[t]he Legislature is still
wrestling with the problem of watershed protection. The issue is
politically sensitive because it pits a matter of general concern
(protection of watershed land and water sources) against both
the property rights of watershed owners and the taxing interests
of municipal entities . . . . Thus, the fact that no easy resolution
has occurred is neither a surprise nor a signal that the moratorium was meant to expire.” City of Newark v. Township of
Hardyston, 667 A.2d 193, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
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149.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

150. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1027 (1992).
151.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

152.

Id. at 1029.

153. Id. at 1029-30. See generally Louise Halper, Untangling
the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89 (1998).
154. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance
for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1281 (1996).
155. Professor Fred Bosselman has recently traced the
common law roots of wetlands regulation. See Fred Bosselman,
Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands of Common Law, 15 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996).
156. Professor Frank I. Michelman has lucidly pointed out
the tension in Lucas between the desire to expand the scope of
regulatory takings and the Court’s respect for “our federalism.” See
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism and Jurisprudence: A Comment
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993).
See also Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, The Individual and
Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 53 MD. L. REV. 162
(1993).

tions reflect the idea that property is a legal
construct, which has historically reflected both
public and private interests.154 These background limitations can support more intensive
regulation of resources such as wetlands that
have long been subject to judicial and administrative control.155 Furthermore, a federalism
reading of the Lucas qualification would afford
substantial deference to state law to define the
background conditions156 and would support a
less uni-dimensional conception of property
than is currently reflected in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.157 A federalism approach to the
definition of property rights would not compel
the adoption of an ecological concept of property, or the incorporation of an ecosystem support limitation into the right,158 but it would
permit states to integrate this approach into
takings law.159
Despite the Lucas opinion, two contradictory trends are taking place in United States takings law. The first seeks to codify the restrictive
tests of Lucas and impose extra-constitutional
compensation burdens on states. In effect,
states would have to pay to protect the environment. To that end, several states have
passed property rights legislation.160 Such legislation either requires some form of property
rights impact assessment, modeled on environmental impact assessment, or contains a
substantive standard—beyond that required by
federal and state constitutions—to determine
157. The argument that no single “land ethic” is adequate
to define property for Fifth Amendment purposes is brilliantly
developed in Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform,
Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994). Also see the
exchange between Professors Richard Epstein and Frank
Michelman. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech:
The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (1997); Frank
Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for Lost
Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1997).
158. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1433 (1993) (sketching a concept of property as a usufruct
rather than an exclusive right to maximization exploitation). See
also Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1269 (1993); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive
Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1995).
159.

See generally Michelman, supra note 156.

160. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-704 (1999); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 75-1-102, 75-1-103, 75-1-201 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 121-201 (1999).
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the expectation of the “right to convert” is protected by the constitutional guarantee that
property will not be “taken” without just compensation.149 Land is a form of exclusive private
property, and the United States Supreme Court
has recently pronounced that land is the highest form of private property150 and has displayed increasing hostility to the idea that the
state can regulate the use of land to protect
biodiversity.
This hostility to biodiversity protection is
captured in the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.151 Lucas held
that a state beachfront setback line imposed to
protect property from erosion was an unconstitutional taking of the owner’s property because
it virtually destroyed the development value of
the lot. The most far-reaching aspect of the
opinion is the suggestion that a regulation that
has a substantial economic impact may only be
justified if the limitation inheres “in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place on land ownership.”152 Lucas
did, however, recognize that a property owner
cannot claim that a government regulation
constitutes a taking if the regulation codifies
“background principles of nuisance and property law,” although it is clear that Justice Scalia
did not intend it as a widely available justification for severe land use regulations.153
Common law-based background limita-
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when a landowner is entitled to compensation.
The Florida Property Rights Act entitles an
owner to compensation if a regulation inordinately burdens his land or he “bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden
imposed for the good of the public, which in
fairness should be borne by the public at
large.”161
The counter-trend seeks to protect biologically sensitive lands such as wetlands and
endangered species habitats either by preventing development, by allowing development in
return for the dedication of land or the payment of fees to mitigate the adverse effects of
the project, or by providing substitute forms of
compensation.162 State courts have shown considerable support for these efforts either by
holding that the right to create an environmental hazard is not constitutionally protected or by supporting mitigation schemes. For
example, Colorado has held that the enforcement of state radiation control regulations
against a mill site with uranium tailings was
not a taking because no investment-backed
expectations were frustrated.163 “The Mill was
‘on notice’ that the radioactive materials present on the property were dangerous and highly regulated at both the state and federal level
as was the use of the property itself.”164 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
remanded a takings claim to determine if a city

can prevent the development of littoral land
flooded by a public waterbody, under the Lucas
pre-existing title limitation doctrine.165 Iowa
used a similar analysis to hold that state legislation protecting Indian mounds on private
property precluded a takings claim.166 Nevada
has held that regulatory delays in development approvals in the Lake Tahoe Basin are
not a taking because the developer had notice
of a complex regulatory process and the protection of the Tahoe Basin would benefit the
developer when his property was granted
development approval.167
Many jurisdictions are experimenting with
substitute forms of compensation for land
owners whose property is subject to regulation. Transferable development rights
(“TDRs”), originally developed to preserve
urban landmarks, but more recently extended
to the preservation of environmentally sensitive land, are the most common form of substitute. A land owner is assigned rights to
develop which cannot be used on sensitive land
but can be transferred to other land or sold to
other developers. The basic idea is to set the
level of development entitlements for an area,
such as a watershed, and then allow an owner
to detach a number of units from the land,
usually in return for leaving it undeveloped,
and to relocate or anchor those units on
another tract.168 A recent extension of the idea

161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West 1995). See also TEX.
GOV. CODE ANN. § 2007 (West 1999).

City of New York balancing formula. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Good v.
United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 68
U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. April 3, 2000), holds that wetland investors
who purchase with knowledge of the federal regulatory structure
have no investment-backed expectations when a permit is denied
to protect an endangered species.

162. State wetland regulation is analyzed in WILLIAM WANT,
THE LAW OF WETLAND REGULATION ch. 13 (1989). K&K Construction Co.
v. Department of Natural Resources is an important illustration of
state laws which limit the development of water-related property.
575 N.W. 2d 531 (Mich. 1998). A developer applied for permission
to develop an 89-acre tract which was divided into four parcels.
Parcel 1 contained 51 acres, 27 of which were wetlands. Parcel 2
contained 16 acres and a small amount of wetlands. Parcel 3 contained 9.34 acres and Parcel 4 contained 3.4 acres; no wetlands
existed on these two parcels. After a permit denial, the developer filed a taking action and the lower court held that the denominator was Parcel 1. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, and
held that “it is neither realistic nor fair to consider only Parcel 1
for purposes of the taking analysis” because the parcels were contiguous, although the court remanded for a factual finding on one
parcel. Id. at 536 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)). The court found that there
was no categorical Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council taking
because the developer could develop the upland portion of
Parcel 1 and all of parcels 2 and 4. Thus, the plaintiffs must prove
that a taking occurred under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
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163. See Colorado Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993,
1002 (Colo. 1994).
164.

Id. at 1000.

165. See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 131516 (Mass. 1994).
166. See Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1003 (1995).
167. See Kelley v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Authority, 855 P.2d
1027,1034-35 (Nev. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1041 (1994).
168. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE § 12.13 (2d ed.
1988). An early TDR scheme was invalidated because it vested too
much discretion in the local government to designate receiving
parcels. See Montgomery County Citizens’ Ass’n v. Maryland Nat’l
Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 522 A.2d 1328, 1336-37 (Md. Ct.
App. 1987).
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V. The Reemergence of the Watershed as
a Land Management Unit
A. The Rediscovery of River Basin and
Watershed Planning and Management
as an Environmental Protection Strategy
The long history of integrated land and
water planning along hydrologic units seemed
to die in the United States in the 1980s. The
Reagan administration failed to fund the existing river basin commissions and the federal
government continued its withdrawal from
subsidized water development. However, in the
169. See generally Royal Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs:
Wetlands, Mitigation Banking and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1996).
170. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-31 to -54 (West 1999)
(“Pinelands Development Credit Bank Act”).
171. See Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm’n, 593
A.2d 251, 256 (N.J. 1991).
172. See id. at 260-61 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
173. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d
359, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 725
(1997).

1990s, watersheds have reemerged as an ideal
land use control unit and there are a variety of
federal, state and local watershed protection
initiatives underway. Unlike countries such as
Australia, which have a rigorous catchment
planning process,176 there are no uniform, formal watershed planning processes to provide a
framework for integration. No consensus exists
in the United States about the scale or boundaries of such units and the proper allocation of
control authority.177 For example, the terms
“watershed” and “river basin” continue to be
used interchangeably, although “watershed”
now usually refers to the catchment area of an
individual stream or river, and “river basin” to
the drainage area of a large river and its tributaries. Most integrated management is occurring in small watersheds and river basin planning remains focused on the water resource
alone. However, in contrast to the past, the
increasing emphasis in river basin management is on the use of existing supplies to satisfy both traditional right holders and environmental and Native American interests.
Integrated watershed and river basin planning in the United States is currently a series of
ad hoc experiments often driven by citizen and
stakeholder-initiated efforts to protect specific
watersheds rather than by a desire to achieve a
rational, ecologically-based planning objective. The experiments often represent efforts to
overcome the obstacles placed by the current
maze of planning and regulatory programs
which influence watershed management and
use rather than the creation of new planning
and regulatory programs. Three related factors
seem to drive the reemergence of the watershed as planning unit. The first is a search for
alternatives to top-down federal water quality
standards, which have generally been set on a
174.

Id. at 728.

175. See id. at 745-750 (Justices Scalia, O’Connor & Thomas
concurring).
176. The New South Wales Catchment Management Act of
1989 promotes the sustainable management of soil, water quality and vegetation, and the restoration of degraded areas in the
state’s catchemnt areas. See DAVID FARRIER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 89-91 (2d ed. 1993); GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
AUSTRALIA 206 (4th ed. 1995).
177.

See Adler, supra note 16, at 1088-94.
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contemplates the creation of wetland mitigation banks, which will hold entitlements until
they are needed by developers.169 However, the
most important environmental protection
experiment is the one currently in place in the
Pinelands of New Jersey.170 Pineland Development Credits are created based on the development expectations of severely restricted
lands.171 The scheme has been upheld by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.172 Furthermore, in a
recent taking challenge to the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency’s denial of a permit to build a
house on a one-half acre lot because it was
located in a Stream Environment Zone, the
Ninth Circuit held that the claim was unripe, in
part, because the lot owner was given TDRs.173
The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s lack of ripeness holding, but
expressly refused to decide whether “TDRs may
be considered in deciding the issue of whether
there has been a taking . . . as opposed to the
issue of whether just compensation has been
afforded for such a taking.”174 Three concurring
justices argued that TDRs were not relevant to
the first issue because it would lead to undercompensation.175
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state-wide basis, and which do not take into
account the special features of individual
watersheds. Federal standards, for example,
have not effectively limited nonpoint sources
of pollution because the implementation rests
with local officials with the power to control
land use. Also, technologically-based standards do not reward those who find cheaper
mixed technology and management strategies
to achieve a quality objective. In addition, federal water policy initiatives have reached a
dead end. Congress is no longer interested in
regional water development (except for a few
specific “pork barrel” dams) and the water
agencies have been severely limited by budget
cuts. Executive leadership ended in the Carter
Administration. Thus, effective watershed
development is often only possible when a
coalition of federal, state and private stakeholders agree on a plan that is built around the
allowance of some development consistent
with ecological sustainability.178
The current “driver” behind the federal
EPA’s interest in watershed planning is section
1313(d) of the CWA179 which requires the
agency to set total maximum daily loads
(“TMDLs”) for streams that do not meet existing water quality standards. TMDLs are, in
effect, a total watershed waste load allocation
among both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution.180 The allocations require additional
land use controls for nonpoint sources of pollution, such as improved forest practices,
beyond those required by the technology-forcing provisions of the CWA. States must make
the initial identification of watersheds and
“water-quality limited” stream segments that
require TMDL allocations. States and the EPA
were initially reluctant to set TMDLs for most
watersheds and to identify the sources of pollution reduction, especially for watersheds
where agricultural and timber harvesting practices were degrading streams. The identifica-

tion of water-quality limited stream segments
is a long, costly, and uncertain process, and
TMDL allocations pose complex equity and
efficiency issues. States and the federal government must allocate responsibility among
all sources of pollution, point and nonpoint, as
well as among future polluters in a manner
that is fair and efficient. To further complicate
matters, neither the federal government nor
the states have the authority to order the entire
range of land use practices necessary to reduce
nonpoint sources of pollution. Nevertheless,
courts have begun to force the EPA to set stringent TMDL allocations if the state plan is inadequate,181 and so watershed waste load trading
schemes are being considered. The basic idea
is to meet TMDL requirements by encouraging
nonpoint sources to withdraw land from production to reduce sediment loads, rather than
spend greater amounts to upgrade a facility.
However, the feasibility of such trading
schemes has yet to be established.
The second related factor is the emergence
of grassroots organizations interested in conserving and restoring specific places. Again,
integrated watershed management is often a
conceptual focus of local initiatives. Local
efforts at watershed management integration
are usually small-scale and motivated by more
than creating a sustainable watershed. While
small watersheds are often the target of these
efforts, local concern can produce state and
national watershed protection initiatives.
Some of the local watershed integration efforts
are driven by the need to find alternative
means of achieving federal objectives, but
local plans are often joined with efforts to
develop place-based sustainability strategies.182
The third factor is the recognition that
there is an expanded range of stakeholders
who must be accommodated in any legitimate
decision. These three trends are synthesized in

178. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATERSHED
APPROACH FRAMEWORK 5 (1996).

181. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865
(N.D. Ga. 1996); Alaska Center for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981
(9th Cir. 1994). See generally OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S
TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999).

179.
180.
GUIDANCE
(1991).

See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
FOR WATER QUALITY BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS

188

182. See SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE
HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 186
(1993).
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B. The Conceptual Shift: Bioregionalism,
Adaptive Management and Neo PreHuman Background Standards
The most important conceptual development for modern watershed protection is the
shift in focus from rivers divorced from their
terrestrial ecosystem to aquatic ecosystems.
The over-arching concept is bioregionalism,
which seeks to identify “whole systems comprised of sets of diverse, integrated, natural
subsystems and run by ecological laws and
principles.”185 Policy planners advocate moving from a single media or species approach
to an ecosystem approach to biodiversity
management. Ecosystem management is a
substantial conceptual advance over prior
natural resources management principles
because it collapses all conventional conceptual and jurisdictional boundaries and potentially integrates public and private lands and
water in a single functional management unit.
Bioregionalism both complements and contradicts watershed management because it
can support the watershed as the organizing
unit or it can suggest a larger management
unit that subsumes and subordinates watershed protection to other objectives.
The goal of ecosystem management is to
183. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM AND GRANTS GUIDANCE FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1997 AND FUTURE YEARS (1996).
184.

Id. at 2.

185. David Haenke, Bioregionalism: A Territorial Approach to
Governance and Development of Northwest British Columbia (unpublished
M.A. thesis) (on file with author), quoted in Keane Callahan,
Bioregionalism: Wiser Planning for the Environment, 45 LAND USE LAW
AND ZONING DIGEST 3 (Aug. 1993).
186. Environmentalists often make the mistake of assuming that all areas were Edenic prior to European discovery and
occupation, but this overlooks the land use practices of indigenous peoples who often modified the land in substantial ways.
For example, an assessment of aboriginal farming practices in

establish background standards against
which present and future human use can be
measured. It asks a radical question: What
was the region like before intensive human
development?186 The pre-human (or preEuropean settlement) landscape approach
sets new standards to guide modern management decisions to accomplish pre-human
conditions.187
Bioregionalism is supported by the substitution of the non-equilibrium for the equilibrium paradigm in ecology and by the growing science of conservation biology. Bioregionalism seeks to develop areas based on
protection and rehabilitation of all types of
landscapes. This is forward rather than backward looking development because it recognizes that humans will continue to alter the
landscape. Instead of a return to pre-human
conditions, it seeks management strategies
incorporating human use. The influence of
non-equilibrium ecology can be seen in current restoration efforts that seek to protect
remnants of degraded ecosystems.
The ongoing efforts to restore the Florida
Everglades is an example of the implications
of non-equilibrium ecology. The Florida Everglades is a large freshwater marshland that
sits on a shallow bedrock trough in south
Florida. The Everglades formed during the
Pliocene and Pleistocene eras and constitutes
one of the world’s largest wetland systems.
During the past five thousand years a rich
peat, marl and muck base has formed which
supports a biologically diverse and waterdependent Caribbean and temperate ecosystem.188 The southern part of the ecosystem
was designated as a national park in 1947,189
Australia concludes that “[i]n short, the Aboriginal farming system did not conserve the landscape of Australia. It created a new
landscape, which was more productive than the landscape they
found.” NEIL BARR & JOHN CARY, GREENING A BROWN LAND: THE
AUSTRALIAN SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE LAND USE 9 (1992).
187. The Murray Darling Basin Commission has constructed a profile of the river before and after human settlement. See
generally MURRAY DARLING BASIN COMMISSION, THE MURRAY (Norman
Mackay & David Eastburn eds., 1990).
188. See Patrick J. Gleason & Peter Stone, Age, Origin, and
Landscape Evolution of the Everglades Peatland, in EVERGLADES: THE
ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION 149 (Steven M. Davis & John C.
Ogden eds., 1994).
189.

See 16 U.S.C. § 401.
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a recent federal EPA publication for the allocation of nonpoint source control program
grants.183 “The watershed approach is commonly characterized by (a) well-integrated
partnerships, (b) a specific geographic focus,
(c) action driven by environmental objectives
and by strong evidence and data, and (d)
coordinated priority setting and integrated
solutions.”184
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while the northern part has been developed
extensively for agricultural and urban use.
Today, the entire system is under stress. In
brief, the natural system depended on seasonal waterflows, but these flows have undergone
a century of human alteration in the name of
flood control, land reclamation (drainage), and
conservation (urban growth). For example, a
levee was constructed parallel to the coastal
ridge to stop sheet flows toward Palm Beach
and Miami. Also, basins and canals have been
constructed to drain water from the Lake
Okeechobee agricultural area to the Atlantic
and into the national park at times different
from the natural drainage cycles. The canals,
culverts and levees have changed the drainage
cycle from attenuated to pulsating flows, and
the sustainability of the ecosystem has been
subordinated to the minimization of flood risks
during the hurricane season (June-October)
and the storage of water during the dry season
(November-May).190
The adverse impacts of the altered water
flows on the Everglades National Park became
apparent in the late 1960s. Congress initially
tried to solve the problems by quantifying the
park’s reserved water right. Legislation enacted
in 1970 guaranteed the park a 315,000-acre
minimum flow.191 However, increased water
diversion to Miami reduced flows, and the park
became a dumping ground for off-season regulatory releases during periods of abnormal
winter rain. The net result remains a radically
altered flow regime that interrupts the life
cycles of many plant and animal species in the
system. Seasonal drying and flooding cycles
have been disrupted, and some areas have

been deprived of a permanent surface water
cover. In addition, when the water arrives it is
loaded with phosphorus from agricultural runoff.192 Hardwood forests suffer from prolonged
flooding and Florida Bay experiences hypersalinity from reduced freshwater flows. Altered
flow patterns, along with other human
encroachments, is blamed for the large decline
in wading bird populations.193
To “save” the Everglades, the current thinking is that the system must be restored. This is
not a simple return to the status quo. Rather, it
involves the artificial reconstruction of prehuman intervention conditions by sophisticated techniques, such as computer hydrographs
and the design of experimental management
strategies that mimic the natural system to
maintain a viable smaller ecosystem.194 There is
widespread agreement that more low-phosphorus water must be put back in the system
and that the sheet flows must be more continual for longer periods of time during the wet
season to sustain the system during dry periods.195 Experimental flows have been released
but the results are still uncertain. Existing agricultural uses must be reduced to decrease the
nutrients entering the system and this will
require a large amount of public money. All of
this must be done under substantial scientific
uncertainty about species and system responses to restoration efforts and management
strategies must be constantly evaluated and
often revised. In February 1999, a group of biodiversity experts complained to the Secretary
of the Interior that the federal government’s
actions had a high risk of failure because of
insufficient releases into the park.196 Secretary

190. See generally Stephen S. Light & J. Walter Dineen, Water
Control in the Everglades: A Historical Perspective, in EVERGLADES: THE
ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION, supra note 188, at 47.

195. See Carl J. Walters & Lance H. Gunderson, A Screening
of Water Policy Alternatives for Ecological Restoration in the Everglades, in
EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION, supra note 188, at
757. The restoration of prior water levels will raise takings issues.
On the other hand, if the state restores riverine and wetland
ecosystems by flooding land reclaimed from the beds of navigable waters, “[t]he property owner may not be entitled to compensation to the extent that value has been created by government
public works specifically enhancing their property.” Sharon Tisher,
Everglades Restoration: A Constitutional Takings Analysis, 10 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 1, 34 (1994).

191.

See Pub. L. No. 91-282.

192. See Donald L. DeAngelis, Synthesis: Spatial and Temporal
Characteristics of the Environment, in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND
ITS RESTORATION, supra note 188, at 307.
193. See G. Thomas Bancroft et al., Relationships Among
Wading Birds Foraging Patterns, Colony Locations, and Hydrology in the
Everglades, in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION, supra
note 188, at 615.
194. For a brief discussion of the re-creation of simulated
naturalness as a new management baseline, see NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GRAND
CANYON 38-49 (1995).

190

196. See William K. Stevens, Restoration Plan Does Too Little,
Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1999, at A1.
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Babbitt immediately agreed to the creation of
a new scientific panel to monitor the experiment.197 The nub of the problem is the need to
reduce the nutrient loads from upstream sugar
production. A lawsuit brought by the federal
government against Florida led to a settlement198 and a joint federal-state set of principles that were incorporated into a state
statute.199 The settlement contemplated the
construction of a phosphorus reduction facility, including the construction of new marshlands south of Lake Okeechobee, that would
be jointly funded by the federal government,
the state government and the agriculture
industry through various taxes and fees. In
November 1996, however, the Florida voters
rejected a state constitutional amendment
that would have financed restoration programs by levying a one-cent per pound tax on
raw sugar harvested in Florida.
Another river restoration experiment is
underway on the Colorado River in Arizona. In
1963, the federal government began construction of a large storage and hydropower dam,
Glen Canyon Dam, above Grand Canyon
National Park.200 The dam has changed the
ecology of the river and the riparian corridor.
For example, temperatures are colder, which is
threatening endangered fish, and beach building sediment flows have been reduced. Since
the 1980s, the federal government has been
studying the dam-induced changes, and in
1989 the government agreed to prepare an EIS
for the increase in hydroelectric generating
capacity at the dam. The EIS has focused
attention on the possibility of operating the
dam in a different way to mitigate its adverse
impacts.
The dam managers have focused on minor
flow alteration patterns, but in 1996 they
agreed to a large experimental “flood flow” to

release tributary sediment to build beaches in
the Grand Canyon.201 This innovative action
moves in the direction of a baseline of simulated naturalness for the river below Glen
Canyon Dam. There is no simple or accepted
definition of this concept. This management
standard can best be understood as a progressive standard which recognizes that ecosystems are constantly changing and thus static
preservation is impossible. The objective is to
use natural processes, such as erosion, flow
cycles and other ecological processes as standards against which man-made changes can
be measured and, if appropriate, mitigated.
This baseline approximates our understanding
of pre-intervention or background conditions,
within the limitations imposed by science and
law due to the allocation of the river. With
respect to the Grand Canyon, this would
include the following: (1) flows that approximate pre-dam seasonable flows, (2) pre-dam
water temperatures, and (3) pre-dam turbidity
levels, which are both biologically and geologically significant.
As the Everglades and Glen Canyon Dam
experiments illustrate, the restoration and
continuous management of degraded ecosystems will be a major environmental management task in the future. Experiments are now
underway on many river systems, wetlands
and some degraded landscapes to restore the
system to a baseline that reverses the most
harmful effects of altering the natural system
functions.202 If we move toward ecosystem
management, with its larger geographic
scales, parts of the system will inevitably be
degraded or stressed. Nonetheless, restoration is a controversial strategy with many environmentalists because of the argument that
there is a clear distinction between the “natural” and “artificial” and that “value increases as

197. See William K. Stevens, Panel Will Monitor Plan for
Everglades, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at A18.

MANAGEMENT IN THE GRAND CANYON (1996) (introducing the history
of the efforts to decide how to mitigate the downstream corridor
impacts of the operation of the dam).

198. See United States v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 28
F.3d 1563, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1107 (1995).
199. See 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-115. The principles are
reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: A
TEMPLATE FOR DECISION-MAKING IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND (Aug. 5,
1996).
200.

See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE

201. For a more extensive discussion of the history of the
1996 flood release, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The
Paradox of Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J.
1, 9-11 (1997); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE GRAND CANYON (1996).
202. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS (1992).
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naturalness increases.”203 In his important
exploration of the consequences of the nonequilibrium paradigm, Professor Jonathan B.
Wiener observes that the non-equilibrium paradigm leads to resource protection strategies
based on stasis and separatism.204 The view
“that human action is separate from nature
and that the balance of nature is disturbed by
human intrusion” either leads to the view that
humans undesirably interfere with nature or
that “human action represents desirable
dominion over nature.”205
Ecosystem management magnifies the
importance of conservation biology because
this is the source of substantive management
principles such as the dedication of viable
patches of habitat linked by biological corridors.206 It also increases the importance of
adaptive management as the major resource
management strategy207 because it supports
the idea that experimental “place-driven”
strategies replace national standards.208 For
example, the 1996 Safe Drinking Water
Amendment permits public water systems to
substitute source-water or watershed management
for filtration in consolidated ownership, and having control over access
to, and activities in, those watersheds,
if the State determines (and the
Administrator concurs) that the quality of the source water and the alternative treatment requirements established by the State ensure greater
203. Robert Elliot, Extinction, Restoration, Naturalness, 16
ENVTL. ETHICS 135, 143 (1994). Compare Alastair S. Gunn, The
Restoration of Species and Natural Environments, 13 ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS 291 (1991), with C. Mark Cowell, Ecological Restoration and
Environmental Ethics, 15 ENVTL. ETHICS 19 (1993).
204. See Jonathan Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution,
Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 338-345 (1995)
(reviewing JONATHAN B. WIENER, BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF
EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994)).
205.

Id. at 340.

206. See generally Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem
Management: Great Idea, But What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?,
9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 42 (1995); Rebecca W. Thomson, Note,
Saving an Endangered Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA
Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 553 (1995).
207. A recent study conducted by the National Research
Council and the National Academy of Sciences captures the
essence of adaptive management:

192

removal or inactivation efficiencies of
pathogenic organisms for which
national primary drinking water regulations have been promulgated or that
are of public health concern than
would be achieved by the combination
of filtration and chlorine disinfection.209
C. The Roots Problem of Implementing
Bio-regionalism: Vires and the
Delegation of Power to Private Parties
The major legal problem with bio-regionalism or ecosystem management is that it
often has no statutory basis. Ecosystem or
watershed management is a scientific rather
than legal concept, and at present it must be
super-imposed over existing statutes that recognize political jurisdictions justified more by
history than reason and the specific federal
and state agency missions that history has
produced. As a result, watershed protection
efforts must overcome fragmented, incomplete and shared regulatory schemes, existing
both among the three levels of government
and within these levels, as well as the existing
allocation of water and land entitlements.
Thus, the geographic focus of legal regulation
is inevitably narrow.210 It is both difficult for
mission agencies to cross political and cultural boundaries and for units of government to
cooperate and share power among themselves, as well as the regulated community,
now characterized as “stakeholders.”
Adaptive planning and management involve a decision making process based on trial, monitoring, and
feedback. Rather than developing a fixed goal and an
inflexible plan to achieve the goal, adaptive management recognizes the imperfect knowledge of interdependencies existing within and among natural and
social systems, which requires plans to be modified
as technical knowledge improves.
COMMITTEE ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 357 (1992).
208. See generally Thomas W. Jackson & Joshua S. Wyner, The
New Hot Doctrine: Ecosystem Management, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at
15.
209.

42 U.S.C. § 300-9-1(b)(7)(c).

210. I have explored these problems in A. Dan Tarlock,
Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995).
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Existing watershed experiments concentrate on small geographic areas such as a creek
watershed or a small river. There are numerous
such watershed initiatives underway in the
United States. Some are simply for information
sharing; others seek to solve specific physical
and regulatory problems by using a consensus
of stakeholders to secure government and private approval of specific programs that meet
federal and state regulatory objectives.211 These
efforts are an example of a number of experiments to supplement rigid command and control regulation with more flexible collaborative
governance processes.212 Collaborative governance generally seeks to craft a consensus
among a limited group of stakeholders.213
The ultimate watershed protection “deal”
would be that local collaborative processes
would set watershed and basin environmental
standards. For this deal to work, private parties
must forego the enjoyment of their full development entitlements in return for public
approval of watershed management plans as
consistent with environmental protection and
related mandates. The Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission recently
endorsed a version of this collaborative governance “deal.” In Water Policies for the Future, the
Commission proposed “nest” watershed governance which would involve: (1) the revival of
river basin commissions as river basin forums
representing federal, state, tribal, local governments and stakeholder groups, (2) the horizontal coordination of federal spending and regulation within river basins, (3) the vertical integration of federal programs from the basin
level to watershed groups, and (4) greater
reliance on adaptive management.214 The basin
forum would engage in a planning process to

establish “measurable objectives for the basin
which would comply with federal, tribal,215
state, and local substantive law.”216 To implement the plans and standards, a basin trust
fund would be established and fed by public
and private monies. The nub of the proposal
would be the enactment of congressionally
authorized watershed governance pilot programs. Watershed councils would identify specific plans and projects to meet local needs in
a manner consistent with the objectives established in the basin plan and “[a]ny project
which is submitted by watershed councils to
comply with the objective set at the basin level
shall be presumed consistent with prevailing
laws unless in sixty days it is found inconsistent with relevant authorities.”217
This deal raises both vires and constitutional issues. State and federal agencies generally lack the formal authority to adopt local or
place-based solutions as national ones.
However, federal agencies are cobbling together conservation and restoration plans that rely
on government-private cooperation. These
efforts are vulnerable to legal challenges as
ultra vires. Natural resources management is
not, in fact, place-driven; it is centralized. The
great conservation battles of this century have
been fought to eliminate or minimize placebased, that is, local and low, standards by subjecting them to the discipline of scientific
national standards, and this lesson was carried
forward into environmental protection legislation. Congress could, of course, authorize
agencies to adopt place-based solutions as the
national standard, but environmentalists
remain profoundly skeptical of doing so. The
most notable effort to base a resource conservation program on place-based standards, the

211. For a comprehensive summary of western watershed
groups and their activities, see UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW CENTER, THE WATERSHED SOURCE BOOK: WATERSHEDBASED SOLUTIONS TO NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS (undated).

214. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION,
WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE xv-xvix [hereinafter WATER POLICIES].
I wish to disclose that I was the principal report writer for the final
report. However, the concept of a new template for river basin
and watershed governance was developed by the commission
itself.

212. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
213. Professor James Rossi is a leading critic of the fruits
of open-ended public participation in environmental decisionmaking triggered by the access revolution of the now-mythic late
1960s and early 1970s. See James Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The
Costs of Mass Participation in Deliberative Agency Decision-Making, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997).

215. Indian tribes now have considerable power under the
Clean Water Act to adopt high water quality standards and to
impose these on non-Indian water users. See, e.g., Flathead
Reservation in Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
216.

WATER POLICIES, supra note 214, at xviii.

217.

Id. at xix.
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Taylor Grazing Act,218 has been a disaster for
watersheds. The more likely scenario, as illustrated by the Bay-Delta “process,” is to experiment with the use-based stakeholder groups,
prodded by substantial federal and state
involvement,219 to develop acceptable solutions that achieve the objectives of federal
environmental programs.
The substitution of voluntary watershed
protection efforts for the administration of
existing laws is also vulnerable to legal challenges, and several recent cases have held that
voluntary protection does not comply with the
ESA’s mandates. Oregon Natural Resources Council
v. Daley illustrates a successful legal challenge.220 In brief, the populations of evolutionarily significant units of coastal Coho salmon
have been declining for a variety of anthropocentric and natural reasons. The decision
whether to list the Coho as a threatened
species under the ESA has been a political
football throughout the 1990s because protection and restoration require intensive public
and private land use and water management.
The anthropocentric reasons include timber
harvest practices, livestock grazing and water
diversions. In 1997, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) withdrew an earlier
proposal to list the Coho as a threatened
species because the Oregon Coastal Salmon
Restoration Initiative221 would reverse the population decline.222 California units were listed
because the state dragged its feet in formulating a similar initiative.223 The rejection of the
state-federal “deal” has not, however, deterred
218.

43 U.S.C. § 35.

219. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
220.

6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).

221. The Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative
also supplemented the Northwest Forest Management Plan
adopted in 1994 to save the spotted owl.
222. See Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern
California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon,
62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (May 6, 1997).
223.

Oregon from moving ahead with its watershed
protection strategy.224 Scientific opinion within
NMFS was divided on the effectiveness of the
initiative and on the need to list the species.
A magistrate judge invalidated the decision not to list because NMFS applied the
wrong ESA standard in its decision not to
list.225 A species must be listed if it is likely to
become extinct in the foreseeable future, but
the NMFS only evaluated the effect of the
Initiative on population declines over a two
year period.226 The primary flaw in NMFS’s
approach was to base its decision not on science but in faith in future actions taken by the
legislative and executive branches of Oregon.227
“NMFS . . . was unwilling to make the hard
choice required by the ESA.”228 This led to the
conclusion that reliance on the state’s initiative was arbitrary and capricious because it
relied on unimplemented, largely voluntary
future actions.229 Oregon’s initiative relied in
part on voluntary watershed councils where
landowner participation was “largely voluntary.”230 NMFS had rejected California’s action
plan, in part, because the state had not funded
a paper watershed initiative and landowner
participation was voluntary. The court found
the agency’s failure to explain why Oregon’s
initiative did not pose the same risks as
California’s “telling.”231 “However laudable
Oregon’s efforts to employ new management
techniques to try to restore the Oregon Coast
[evolutionary significant unit], such future voluntary conservation effort cannot be a substitute for listing.”232

See id.

224. See THE OREGON PLAN FOR SALMON AND WATERSHED 1990
(on file with author).
225.

See Oregon Natural Resources Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at
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See id.
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Id. at 1152.

229. A series of previous district court opinions held that
the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (“FWS”) could not rely
on possible future management actions by other agencies. See
Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C.
1996); Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Service, 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996). The Ninth Circuit
held that the FWS could not excuse its duty to designate critical
habitat for the California gnatcatcher on an elaborate reserve system created under a voluntary state program. See Natural
Resources Defense Council v. United States. Dep’t of Interior, 113
F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997).
230.

See Oregon Natural Resources Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at

1159.
231.

See id.

232.

Id.
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Under existing programs, federal agencies
retain the discretion to decide if a stakeholder
initiative complies with federal standards. This
does not raise constitutional issues because
there has been no delegation of legislative
authority to private parties. If local groups had
the authority to bind federal and state governments to place-based solutions to specific
implementation plans, it would raise serious
separation of power and due process issues.233
Courts by and large have decided that the prohibition against the delegation of legislative
authority to administrative agencies, and to
mixed private public bodies, is best enforced
by protecting the procedural rights of the regulated community. Moreover, Chevron, USA, Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council234 signals an
unwillingness to use the delegation doctrine to
police administrative agencies. In place of the
delegation doctrine, Chevron suggests finding a
regulation ultra vires when an agency strays too
far from congressional purpose.235 The considerations that support nonenforcement of the
delegation doctrine to administrative agencies
do not support its abandonment when power
is delegated to private parties. Private decision
making, without some form of effective public
checks, reinforces unequal distributions of
political power. This creates a high risk that
decisions will be made from a narrow perspective to the exclusion of other relevant considerations and without control by either the
Executive or Congress.236

VI. Conclusion

233.
(1936).

236. See generally Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary
Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1990).

See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 213

234.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

235.

Id.

The reemergence of the watershed as a
planning and regulatory unit in the United
States represents an ambitious and promising
attempt to adapt the rigidity of unnatural political boundaries to ecological reality. At the current time, the efforts are ad hoc and experimental, and the jury is still out on their success. Sometimes, they are limited to a local
jurisdiction, but often, out of necessity, they
involve federal, state and local governments. If
watershed protection is to become the principal vehicle for the practice of environmentally
sustainable land and water management, it
must overcome two barriers. First, inter-governmental cooperation must become the norm
rather than the exception as it is now. Public
agencies must adapt their missions to this new
and incompletely defined idea. Second, historic water and land use entitlements must be
modified to make them consistent with the
sustainability of watersheds as ecologically
functioning units.237 The incorporation of a
public dimension into private entitlements
must be the ultimate objective of the many
ambitious cooperation and consensus efforts
currently underway across the United States.
This should be done in a manner consistent
with stakeholder public participation that does
not paralyze the process.

237. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land,
23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631 (1996).
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